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ABSTRACT
Adversarial attacks pose significant challenges for detecting adver-
sarial attacks at an early stage. We propose attack-agnostic detec-
tion on reinforcement learning-based interactive recommendation
systems. We first craft adversarial examples to show their diverse
distributions and then augment recommendation systems by de-
tecting potential attacks with a deep learning-based classifier based
on the crafted data. Finally, we study the attack strength and fre-
quency of adversarial examples and evaluate our model on standard
datasets with multiple crafting methods. Our extensive experiments
show that most adversarial attacks are effective, and both attack
strength and attack frequency impact the attack performance. The
strategically-timed attack achieves comparative attack performance
with only 1/3 to 1/2 attack frequency. Besides, our black-box detec-
tor trained with one crafting method has the generalization ability
over several crafting methods.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Theory of computation→Adversarial learning; • Informa-
tion systems→ Recommender systems.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Interactive recommendation systems capture dynamic personal-
ized user preferences by improving their strategies continuously
[7, 12, 13]. They have attracted enormous attention and been applied
in leading companies like Amazon, Netflix, and Youtube. The tra-
ditional methods to model user-system interactions include Multi-
Armed Bandit (MAB) or Reinforcement Learning (RL). The former
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views action choices as a repeated single process, while the latter
considers immediate and future rewards to model behavors’ long-
term benefits. RL-based systems employ a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) agent that estimates the value based on both actions and
states, rather than merely on actions as done by MAB.
However, reinforcement learning-based models can be fooled by
small disturbances on the input data [3, 11]. Small imperceptible
noises, such as adversarial examples, may increase prediction error
or reduce reward in supervised and RL tasks—the input noise can
be transferred to attack different parameters even different models,
including recurrent network and RL [2, 5]. Besides, the embedding
vectors of users, items and relations are piped into RL-based rec-
ommendation models, making it challenging for humans to tell the
true value or to dig out the real issues in the models. Attackers
can easily leverage such characteristics to disrupt recommendation
systems silently, making defending adversarial attacks a non-trivial
task for RL-based recommendation systems.
In this work, we aim to develop a general detection model to
detect attacks and increase the defence ability, which provides a
practical strategy to overcome the dynamic ‘arm-race’ of attacks
and to defend in the long run. We make the following contributions:
• We systematically investigate adversarial attacks and de-
tection approaches with a focus on reinforcement learning-
based recommendation systems and demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of the designed adversarial examples and strategically-
timed attack.
• We propose an encoder-classification detection model for
attack-agnostic detection. The encoder captures the temporal
relationship among sequence actions in reinforcement learn-
ing. We further use an attention-based classifier to highlight
the critical time steps out of ample interactive space.
• We empirically show that even small perturbations can re-
duce the performance of most attack methods significantly.
Our statistical validation shows that multiple attack methods
generate similar actions of the attacked system, providing
insights into improving the detection performance.
2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 RL-based Interactive Recommendation
Interactive recommendation systems suggest items to users and
receives feedback. Given a user uj ∈ U = {u0,u1,u2, ...,un }, a
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Figure 1: Our proposedAdversarial Attack andDetectionAp-
proach for RL-based Recommender Systems.
set of items I = {i0, i1, i2, ..., in }, and the user feedback history
ik1 , ik2 , ..., ikt−1 , the recommendation system suggests a new item
ikt . This problem represents a Markov Decision Process as follows:
• State (st ): a historical interaction between a user and the rec-
ommendation system computed by an embedding or encoder
module.
• Action (at ): an item or a set of items recommended by the
RL agent.
• Reward (rt ): a variable related to a user’s feedback to guide
the reinforcement model towards true user preference.
• Policy (π (at |st )): a conditional probability distribution of
items which the agent might recommend to a user ui given
the state of last time step st−1. The learning process aims to
get an optimal policy.
• Value function (Q(st ,at )): the agent’s estimation of reward
of current states st and recommended item at . We define
the reward as the cosine similarity between user and item
embedding vectors.
The reinforcement agent could follow REINFORCE with baseline
or Actor-Critic algorithm that both consist of a value network
and a policy network [14]. The attack model may generate adver-
sarial examples using either the value network [5] or the policy
network[10].
2.2 Attack Model
FGSM-based attack.We define an adversarial attack as an addi-
tional small perturbation δ on benign examples x , which can be
a composition of embedding vectors of users, relations and items
[14]. Unlike perturbations on images or texts, δ can be large due to
the enormous manual work to check the embedding vectors. We
define an adversarial example as
min
δ
RT =
T∑
t=1
Q(st + δ , at ).
at = π
∗(at |st + δ ) subject to S(st , st + δ ) ≤ l
(1)
Attack with smaller frequency. The strategically-timed attack
[6] aims to decreases the attack frequency without sacrificing the
performance of the un-targeted reinforcement attack. We formally
present it below:
δt = δt ∗ ct ct ∈ {0, 1},
∑T
t=1 ct
T
< d (2)
where ct is a binary variable that controls when to attack; d < T is
the frequency of adversarial examples. There are two approaches
to generate the binary sequence c1:T optimizing a hard integer pro-
gramming problem and generating sequences via heuristic methods.
Let p0,p1 be the two maximum probability of an policy π , ct be the
attack mask on time step, which is different from [6]:
ct = (p0 − p1) > threshold
We pick out actions that have the max distance between the highest
two probabilities, which means we attack on the most confident
actions of the agent. Experiments show that this strategy works.
In contrast, Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [9] and
Deepfool [8] are based on the gradient of actions rather than the
gradient of Q value. One key component of JSMA is saliency map
computation, which decides which dimension of vectors (in Image
classification is pixels) are modified. Deepfool pinpoints the attack
dimension by comparison of affine distances between some class
and temporal class.
2.3 Detection Model
The detection model is a supervised classifier detects adversarial
examples with actions of the reinforcement agent. Suppose the
action distributions of an agent are shifted by adversarial examples
(Section 3 shows statistical evidence of the drift). Given an abnor-
mal action sequence a = π∗(a |s + δ ), the detection model aims to
establish separating hyperplane between adversarial examples and
normal examples, thereby measuring the probability p(y |a,θ ) or
p(y |π∗, s,δ ,θ ), where y is a binary variable indicating whether the
input data are attacked.
To detect the adversarial examples presented in the last section,
we employ an attention-based classifier. The detection model con-
sists of two parts. The first is a GRU encoder, to encode the action
methods into a low dimensional feature vector. The second is an
attention based decoder with classifier to separate different data.
This encoder-decoder model has a bottleneck structure that filters
out noisy information. The formulation of GRU is as follows:
zt = σд(Wzat +Uzht−1)
rt = σд(Wrat +Urht−1)
hˆt = tanh(What +Uh ◦ ht−1)
ht = (1 − zt ) ◦ ht−1 + zt ◦ hˆt
(3)
We use a1:T to denote action sequence, which is a series of user
relation vectors or item embedding vectors. ht is the output of
encoder.
The attention-based decoder is formulated below.
αt = So f tmax(Wee + be )t
outt+1,hidt+1 = GRU (αtat ,hidt )
pt = Siдmoid(Woutoutt + bout )
(4)
where e is the combined vector of action embedding, hidden states
hid and encoder output, the combination method is a linear unit
with ReLU activation. GRU is reused to generate multiple hidden
states at each time steps. Loss is computed at each time step. After
processed through the attention model and GRU, the vector is then
piped into a linear unit with sigmoid function to predict if the agent
is polluted. The loss function is the cross entropy between the true
label and corresponding probability,
J (Att(a1:T ),y) = −y ◦ loд(p)
3 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we report our experiments to evaluate attack meth-
ods and our detection model.
3.1 Dataset and Experiment Setup
We conduct experiments following [1] and [14] over a Amazon
dataset [4]. This public dataset contains user reviews and metadata
of the Amazon e-commerce platform from 1996 to 2014. We utilize
three subsets, namely Beauty, Cellphones, and Clothing, which
are originally provided by [14] on Github . Details about Amazon
dataset analysis can be found in [14].
Our experiments are based on [14]. During dataset preprocess-
ing,feature words with higher TF-IDF scores than 0.1 are filtered
out. 70% of data in each dataset comprises the training set (the
rest are the test set). We take actions of reinforcement agent as
the detection data. We define the actions of PGPR [14] as hetero-
geneous graph paths that start from users and have a length of 4.
The three Amazon sub-datasets (Beauty, Cellphones, and Clothing)
contain 22,363, 27,879, and 39387 users, respectively. To accelerate
experiments, we use the first 10,000 users of each dataset to produce
adversarial examples. Users in Beauty get, on average, 127.51 paths.
The counterparts for Cellphones and Clothing are 121.92 and 122.71.
As the number of paths is large, we utilize the first 100,000 paths for
train and validation with split ratio 80/20. We randomly sampled
100,000 paths from each action file to form the test set.
We attack trained RL agent with methods in section 2.2. We
slightly modify JSMA and Deepfool for our experiments—we create
the saliency map by calculating the product of the target label and
temporal label and achieve both effectiveness and higher efficiency
(by 0.32 seconds per iteration) of JSMA; we decrease the computa-
tion load on a group of gradients on Deepfool by sampling. Besides,
we set the hidden size of the GRU to 32 for the encoder, the drop
rate of the attention-based classifier to 0.5, the maximum length
of a user-item path to 4, the learning rate and weight decay of the
optimization solver, Adam, to 5e-4 and 0.01, respectively.
3.2 Attack Experiments
Adversarial attack results.We are interested in how vulnerable
the agent is to perturbation in semantic embedding space. An attack
will be effective if a small perturbation leads to a notable perfor-
mance reduction. We reuse the evaluation metrics of [14], namely
Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG), Recall, Hit Ra-
tio (HR), and Precision for evaluation. All metrics are computed
based on the top 10 sorted predictions for each user, and they are
presented in percentage without specific notion.
Table 1 shows the performance of different attack methods. At-
tack results share the same trend with the distribution discrepancy.
Most attack methods significantly reduce the performance of the
reinforcement system. FGSM l1 achieves the best performance. It
reveals that single dimension attack can change the agent’s action
drastically. While FGSM l2 is less effective, where the metrics just
fluctuates around the original baseline (Table 1), partly because of
small disturbance created by l2 method. Specifically, JSMA achieves
comparable results as linf with a small attack region. Attacks on
Clothing and Cellphones sub-datasets show similar effects.
Impact of attack frequency. We conduct two experiments on
attack frequency, random attack and strategically attack. The dif-
ference is if adversarial examples are crafted with a frequency
parameter pf r eq , or generated by the method shown in Section 2.2.
The NDCG metric is presented in Figure 2; other metrics have a
similar trend. It can be seen from 2 that the random attack performs
worse than the strategically-timed attack. With strategically timed
method, attacking 13 − 12 time steps achieves a significant reduction
in all metrics.
Figure 2: NDCG of attack frequency on Beauty and Cloth-
ing subsets. Dashdot lines represent random attacks, solid
lines are strategically-timed attacks. Blue and green lines
are FGSM linf and l1 attacks respectively.
Analysis of adversarial examples.We use Maximum Mean Dis-
crepancy as statistical measures to capture distribution distance.
This divergence is defined as:
MMD(k,Xorд ,Xadv ) = sup
k ∈K
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
k(xorд,i ) − 1
m
n∑
i=1
k(xadv,i )
)
wherek is the kernel function, i.e., a radial basis function,Xorд ,Xadv
are benign and adversarial examples.
MMD-org reveals the discrepancy between the original and ad-
versarial datasets. And MMD-l1 presents the discrepancy among
different attack methods. The results (Table 1) show that the adver-
sarial distribution is different from the original distribution. Also,
the disturbed distributions are closed to each other regardless of
the attack type. This insight makes it clear that we can use a classi-
fier to separate benign data and adversarial data and it can detect
several attacks at the same time, which might be transferred to
other reinforcement learning attack detection tasks.
3.3 Detection Experiments
From a statistical perspective, the above analysis shows that one
classifier can detect multiple types of attacks. We evaluate the
detection performance using Precision, Recall and F1 score.
Table 1: Adversarial attack results, MMD between benign distribution and adversarial distribution on Amazon Beauty
Data Parameters NDCG Recall HR Precision MMD-org MMD-l1
Original - 4.654 6.572 13.993 1.675 0.121 0.620
FGSM l1 ϵ =0.1 2.695 3.714 6.599 0.693 0.604 0.010
FGSM l2 ϵ =1.0 4.567 6.555 13.751 1.653 0.016 0.573
FGSM linf ϵ =0.5 2.830 3.909 7.351 0.787 0.570 0.011
JSMA - 2.984 3.844 8.254 0.931 0.412 0.034
Deepfool - 3.280 4.352 9.548 1.050 0.177 0.458
Our attention-based detectionmodel is trained on FGSM l1 attack
with ϵ at 0.1 and detects all attack types. The results (Table 2) show
that the attack are stronger, the model achieves better performance.
l∞ attack validates this trend, which shows that our model can
detect weak attacks as well. The result of detection on l2 attack
can be reasoned with MMD analysis shown above, high precision
and low recall show that most l2 adversarial examples are close
to benign data which confuses the detector. The l1 attack with
ϵ = 1.0 validates that our detector performs well yet achieves
worse performance on other tests of Cellphones dataset.
Table 2: Detection Result & Factor Analysis
Dataset Attack Precision Recall F1 Score
Beauty l1 0.1 0.919 0.890 0.904
l2 1.0 0.605 0.119 0.199
linf 0.5 0.918 0.871 0.894
JSMA 0.910 0.793 0.848
Deepfool 0.915 0.840 0.876
Cellphones l1 0.1 0.801 0.781 0.791
l2 1.0 0.754 0.593 0.664
linf 0.5 0.795 0.752 0.773
l1 1.0 0.810 0.825 0.817
Clothing l1 0.1 0.911 0.866 0.888
l2 1.0 0.541 0.099 0.168
linf 0.5 0.912 0.879 0.895
Dataset Frequency Precision Recall F1 Score
Beauty l1 0.02 0.823 0.362 0.503
l1 0.08 0.918 0.872 0.894
l1 0.3 0.922 0.927 0.924
Dataset Frequency Precision Recall F1 Score
Beauty l1 0.579 0.921 0.912 0.917
l1 0.316 0.918 0.879 0.898
l1 0.118 0.837 0.401 0.543
Our results on factor analysis (Table 2) show that the detection
model can detect attacks even under low attack frequencies. But
the detection accuracy decreases as the attack frequency drops—the
recall reduces significantly to 40.1% when 11.8% examples represent
attacks.
4 CONCLUSION
Adversarial attacks on reinforcement learning-based recommenda-
tion system can degrade user experience. In this paper, we systemat-
ically study adversarial attacks and their factor impacts. We conduct
statistical analysis to show classifiers, especially an attention-based
detector, can well separate the detection data. Our extensive exper-
iments show both our attack and detection models achieve satisfac-
tory performance.
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